The 2022 War in Ukraine
Who started it?
Putin, unequivocally. Not Ukraine indirectly. Not NATO indirectly. Not the U.S indirectly. Putin, by himself, as an act of ultimate vanity. An aging dictator with the God complex, longing for a legacy.
NATO membership is voluntary, and it is a defensive alliance (Article 5). NATO has never led an invasion of a country. Putin's argument of a danger at Russia's border can only be rooted in his deeper 'Imperial-Russia' nationalistic read of history where Russian land was unfairly 'lost' to foreign powers. Which is delusion.
John Mearsheimer makes the following case in The Economist:
The issue which such statement is that it forgets a simple fact; Ukrainian WANTED to be free and majorly voted for a progressive democrat.
It is Putin who continues believing in a grand Russia that no longer exists and likely never will again.
While this sentence correctly describes the issue, as an expression of a prescriptive position, it is nonsensical; akin to saying that your actions are my fault because I did not account for your irrationality, ambitions, feelings, and desires in the execution of actions affecting people and regions that are not under your authority.
I bit like the violent boyfriend who got dumped but feels he still has a say on how his ex lives her life...
Are we really facing equal propaganda from both sides and therefore, we can't really know what's going on?
That there is propaganda coming from the Russian and the Ukrainian/Western world's sides is undeniable. However, on the Russian side, the narrative is centrally controlled whereas it is impossible to enforce a single narrative within the free world unless it mostly reflects reality, as the free press competes for viewership. Being able to have a differentiated news offering is good for ratings. Combined with citizen journalism, which makes it difficult for a false narrative to survive for long as the main narrative.
A few examples of this:
- Just a few weeks before the conflict, as Russian troops amassed along the Ukrainian border, the western world certainly was not exposed to a single narrative of certain and imminent Russian invasion ("No, Russia will not invade Ukraine", "an administration official, say Russia could begin the offensive 'as soon as early 2022'", "The truth is; no-one really knows what Valdimir Putin intends", Ben Hodges predicts end of February invasion, "I don’t know"). The Ukrainian government itself did not believe in an imminent invasion ("threat from Russia remains 'dangerous but ambiguous'", "dangerous, but not imminent").
- Most analysts in the free world predicted a swift victory of the Russian military ("...overrun Kiev in a matter of hours.", "Kyiv fall in days, leave 50,000 civilians dead", "Kyiv will likely fall within days, if not hours", "Ukraine’s military is no match for Russia's sophisticated hardware, and Kyiv would likely fall within days"). The superiority of the Russian army in terms of availability of resources was and still is undeniable. We have witnessed, however, that a war's outcome is not simply a factor of greater firepower.
The fact remains that the information the free world's population was exposed to has been and has evolved over time, as the situation did, while the population of Russia was only exposed to a loopy narrative of Nazism eradication, and a fabricated storyline meant to stoke Russian nationalism.
Why doesn't the West implement a no-fly zone or get some boots on the ground?
Biden and NATO in general have been clear that they do not want this regional war to escalate into a global conflict. First, because it would be costly for both sides.
A no-fly zone is a de facto declaration of war since it would require NATO member country's military to shoot down planes over and sometimes even before they enter the Ukrainian airspace, in Belarus and Russia. In the fog of war, things can escalate very quickly; what happens if Russia claims that NATO destroyed some planes over Russia and retaliates?
Furthermore, Russia did not achieve air superiority, and the Ukrainian army has been able to shoot down many Russian planes and helicopters, putting the risk-reward calculation of a NATO no-fly zone in question.
Finally, a no-fly zone would do nothing to prevent Russia to continue firing long range missiles from the Black Sea, Belarus, and from Russian land (about half of the approximate 1,400 missiles fired by Russia as of March 30th, 2022)
Any direct involvement of any number of NATO countries would lead to an even bloodier conflict that would rapidly spread. Putin, clearly being outgunned in an all-out war with NATO, would have qualm in using WMDs.
There is also another crucial factor that revealed itself just a few days after the Russian invasion started; the attack was going terribly wrong, and every day saw Putin's losing significant assets at little political and financial costs to NATO.- As of March 26th, the Russian military is losing senior commanders at exceedingly fast pace: "at least 15 senior Russian commanders have been killed in the field, said Markiyan Lubkivsky, a spokesperson for the Ukraine Ministry of Defense. NATO officials estimated earlier this week that as many as 15,000 Russian troops have been killed in four weeks of war, a very high number."
- As of March 27, 2022, Oryx, the brainchild of Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, two independent military analysts devoted to investigating and sharing the ins and outs of conflict research using open-source intelligence, listed 1948 equipment losses for the Russian side, while the Ukrainian Army listed 4231. Provided that Oryx requires a picture of the lost piece of equipment, it is fair to say that the actual number is somewhere in between the two. In short, a complete military quagmire which puts in question whether the Russian army is still a first tier one.
- Just in sheer costs, Russia will not be able to sustain this war for much longer without diverting capital that would otherwise be required to service the Russian population. "Daily cost of Ukraine war likely to exceed $20B for Russia". Equipment alone is in the billions. Remember that the entire military budget of Russia in 2021 was around USD $65 billion (4.3% of GDP). When this is all over, Russia will have spent 2 to 5 times that amount in this war. The U.S. and NATO will not have spent more than a tenth of that amount. Even if the U.S, the U.K, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey spent the full amount of Russia's 2021 military budget on helping Ukraine, it would still constitute less than 0.2% of their combined GDPs. This economic asymmetry is going to be the ultimate bottleneck for Putin as the war drags on.
There are very few incentives for the U.S and other NATO allies to escalate their support beyond providing defensive armements to the Ukrainian army as every day that goes by sees Putin dig deeper into the bog that he created for himself.
The U.S obviously did not plan nor even stoked this war in Ukraine. Similarly, it and NATO cannot be directly involved with it as it would be world-war III. However, Ukraine's resolve has revealed a silver-lining for the Western-world; Putin will never back down, and he will allow his army to slowly bleed to death in Ukraine. That is what autocrats do; they never admit defeat.
Any way the free world can find to support Ukraine's defense and exert maximum damage to Russia's military without entering a direct conflict will further reveal to the world that Putin has single-handedly annihilated the view of the Russian military as one of a superpower and would shame him in the eyes of his people.
This sign of desperation would be an attempt at extending the conflict beyond Ukraine or using WMDs. Should it occur, NATO should immediately have a military response ready as it would mean that Putin has accepted his faith and wants to go in an apocalyptic blaze of folly.
What did Putin get wrong and how could he have gotten it so wrong?
- Putin was sold on the idea that toppling the Kyiv government would happen in a matter of hours, or days at-the-most, as the Ukrainian people and army would immediately surrender. We know that was the case because his troops ran out of fuel, food, water, after just a few days. Only within that frame of mind would an attacking force barely equal in numbers to the defending force would make sense. It obviously did not.
- Putin underestimated how fierce, motivated, and clever the Ukrainian resistance would be. He also underestimated Zelensky courage, resolve, and leadership.
- Putin just did not understand the extent in which a "clear majority of Ukrainians back the country’s European choice and support further Euro-Atlantic integration. This has been demonstrated at the ballot box in numerous elections since 2014 and is regularly confirmed in opinion polls that indicate overwhelming levels of support for EU and NATO membership. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s formerly powerful pro-Russian politicians have seen support plummet in recent years and can no longer win national elections.", instead believing that "most Ukrainians are eager to join the “Russian World” and are only prevented from doing so by the nationalist fanatics and Western agents who have seized power."
- The invaders were lacking the military intelligence, willingness to use it, or plain dismissed it. It is unlikely that the Russians were oblivious to the fact that the Ukrainian army had been trained and equipped by the West to make a blitzkrieg difficult (Javelins, Stingers, and these Bayraktar TB2 Turkish bomber drones that inflicted stunning damage both to the Russian equipment and moral)
Once the pattern followed by Putin became clear, the outcome and the why also became limpid. To the point that I could not understand how there was so much debate in the Western Newsmedia as to "how could Putin get everything so wrong?".
Then, it struck me that my viewpoint and what I consider evident has been molded by the past 10 years of observing first-hand how a dictatorship operates, here in Hong Kong, and seing its playbook being applied item-by-item in Putin's actions.
Here is how a dictatorship operates and how it ultimately leads to failure:
- Elimination of neutralization of opponents
- Concentration of power; decisions are not made based on the concerted knowledge of a group with competing goals but are limited to a small circle, or even a single individual
- No checks and balance. Unchallenged leaders will eventually make bad calls.
- Elimination of all sources of opposition (free press, separation of powers, rule-of-law, etc)
- Reliance on propaganda and force to align public opinion to the dictator's, leading to a broken feedback loop, further isolating the dictator from a necessary reality-check
- Eventually, it will always lead to the creation of a small but very tight echo chamber where the "supreme leader" is feared by his clique, leading to the creation of a reporting structure where only positive news is allowed. The only incentive for the apparatchik is to align, to gain privileges within the system and, at the highest levels, even to stay alive.
- Rewarding obedience as the most desirable political trait rather than merit fosters a culture of incompetence
- In turn, incompetence breeds corruption
- Invariably, the disconnect between what the dictator wants and what reality can allow results in cognitive dissonance which can only be resolved through popular acceptance of comforting lies via the promotion of emotion-driven propaganda. Usually through the use of fear, and the creation of an ultra-nationalist narrative where the enemies are always foreign, and heroic figures emerge to fight them (the dictator himself being the ultimate hero)
- The dictator creates a parallel reality for himself, and that self-delusion ensures that terrible decisions become the norm rather than the exception.
- In most instances in history, it leads to a failed-state and the dictator is ousted.
The idea supporting the autocrat's delusion is that he can control all and that he knows all. He builds himself a feedback loop exaggerating confirmation bias and distorting reality. For someone outside of the influence of the dictator, the situation seems incomprehensible.
But to the autocrat, the reverse is true.
That is akin to observing the actions of a cult from the outside in, as opposed to being a member... or the leader.
Beyond the fact that dictatorships have an expiry date, an advantage for the free world is that, as they lack the innovative power of a group of independent thinkers, dictators are also quite predictable, and so are their followers.
At one point, the dictator will make a move which will, due to the sheer outlandishness of the action, force a schism in the host society, and worldwide. On one side, the dictator-aligned, and the opponents on the other. The identification of this watershed moment is important in understanding how committed a dictator and its supporters (from all political creeds) are to his ideology, and how distanced from reality they have become (and therefore, how dangerous the situation is).
Often, those who were innocently supporting the lies have an epiphany, a moment of reckoning as these pivotal events draw an extremely clear line separating the for and against, the liberal and the autocrats, the truth and the lies, the right and the wrong. In Hong Kong, it was the National Security Law. Putin's invasion of Ukraine's made it impossible for anyone to defend him without buying into his whole deceitful narrative. With Donald Trump, it was the Big Lie surrounding the 2020 election...
How does Putin's complete failure in Ukraine change the world's geo-political landscape?
Where Putin has already lost regardless of the outcome of the war:
- His invasion of Ukraine has bolstered support for NATO, which had suffered an existential crisis under Trump's U.S presidency. Putin's actions managed to convince Finns to join NATO, which could happen very soon, with Sweden likely to follow. That would be a historic policy reversal for Finland. Georgia, which has wanted to join NATO for the longest time, will get a more attentive ear (here). Germany announced it was boosting its defense budget at an unprecedented rate, just a few days after the war started. Poland is accelerating purchase of air defense systems. Japan has sent equipment to Ukraine and is boosting its military.
In the vernacular, that is quite an "own-goal" for Putin...
- The world has very distinctively aligned along the lines of democracy and dictatorship. Neutrality is no longer 'a thing'. And democracies have walked the walk, helping Ukraine financially and with military supplies, and sanctioning Russia...
- Putin has also managed the unwanted feat of undoing some of the damage he had done with his tempering of the American electoral process by galvanizing the American people against him and for Zelensky, across the political spectrum (another self-goal).
- While Asian nations have been worrying about China's imperialistic moves in the South-China sea for a while now and reacting accordingly, Putin's attack made the danger of dealing with a neighboring dictatorship even more concrete and imminent. This will accelerate various non-NATO alliances and initiatives, in light of China's rise.
- The relentless destruction of Russian military assets since February 24th is going to leave a huge doubt as to A. Russia ability to win wars when the adversary is resilient and equipped with modern defensive equipment, and B. whether Russian military tech is any good.
India, which buys 70% of its defense high-end arsenal from Russia, will certainly question whether what it gets is really up-to-par.
China's own arsenal is highly derivative of Russia's, when not direct imports. China, which has never fought a war in modern times, is most likely reconsidering the usefulness, risks, and viability of its military partnership with Russia.
- Most multinational corporations got out of Russia because it was easy, because not doing so was going to cost them more in terms of branding and sales than staying the course. That's how of little consequence Russia's non-resource trade is on the world's stage. While this may not have a large economic impact, it could affect the social psyche of the Russian people which have progressively been used to "Western commercialism" over the past 30 years. A feeling of being behind the curve of progress will certainly cause public resentment. Who this resentment will be targeted at remains to be seen.
- The weak Russian GDP, which is at the same level as it was 12 years ago, will tank a further 7% to 15% in 2022. The Russian economy is collapsing. Putin has condemned Russians to a comparative regression of their lifestyles over at least the next 3 to 5 years.
- Russia is having trouble paying its sovereign debt, even though it is quite low by standard of the free world. Going forward, cost of borrowing will be much higher amid sanctions putting further strain on the Russian government's finances.
- Russia is already pivoting its gas exports from Europe to China. However, the Ukraine war will accelerate the movement for Europe to wean itself off Russian gas. With China being the only consumer, the latter will be able to negotiate prices down considerably compared to Australian imports.
As it is now clear that Russia will not be able to win the war over the entire Ukrainian territory, there are two possible outcomes:
1. Russia conquers Donbas
2. Ukraine wins the war and retakes Donbas.
Outcome 1: Russia conquers Donbas
The loss would be political for Zelensky, and Putin would then be able to sell the invasion as having achieved its "goals" of "liberating Donbas".
With Puting's popular support of late, it would probably be enough to deflect responsibility of the war to the "ennemies of Russia".
A nationalistically re-invigorated Putin would spell disaster for the region with further armed conflicts down the line almost certain.
Outcome 2: Ukraine wins the war and retakes Donbas
It would bring unqualifiable shame to the Russian people.
Putin, being the sole architect of that loss, would surely have to shoulder the blame and questions that rarely get asked of the winners such whether the invasion was justified and thoughtfully planned and executed, would emerge, and spell the leadership's demise. This is essential for post-Ukraine-war Russia; Russians will need to personify a loss of this magnitude, to find someone to blame. A decisive and clear loss in Ukraine will give them this outlet for their frustration and possibly avoid the decades of humiliation that would follow. That is the way out for Russia; blame Putin, reset the relations with the free-world where Russians can see more of the petro-dollars in their pockets, and move on. This definitive and quick Ukrainian win (within a few months) also needs to be solely achieved by the Ukrainians. Any other direct military involvement on the ground (or in the air) of foreign powers, would mitigate the necessary shame of a catastrophic loss.
The Russian people need to have hat very clear, undeniable for the loss, that will make them come to the conclusion that their leader is the cause of defeat, not Russia's.
And not only the military defeat, but also the consequences to Russia's economy and to the Russians' lifestyle.
It would be the only option offering a window of opportunity for true and much needed political reforms in Russia.
It may seem cold and inhuman to speak about numbers, but I believe it is unfortunately going to be what is necessary to take Putin down and end this war with the least amount of overall civilian casualties.
Additionally, if 10% of the Russian armed forces were to perish (that's about 100,000 soldiers), no matter of propaganda could avoid Putin from having to pull out in shame. Obviously, all of these while minimizing casualties on the Ukrainian side.
Speed would therefore be of the essence, with a short-term goal of inflicting maximum damage to the invaders before they have time to fully regroup in the East.
This is a critical shift of strategy from one of defending urban areas, to a focused attack aimed at quickly inflicting maximum damage to the Russian military and force their early exit.
And then, what happens?
Whatever the outcome, I think that the next 10 years will prove globalisation doomsayers wrong; Putin's actions are going to change the nature of globalisation but not its long-term prevalence.
Putin and Xi Jinping have shown the free world that an autocratic government's reform can be stopped by the vanity and ambitions of a single man, and therefore cannot be trusted in the long run.
But the world cannot afford the standard of living it has been accustomed to without globalisation. Partnerships based on the cheapest contract will be weighed against national security and political risks, favoring new partnerships with multiple counterparts rather than strictly bilateral ones.
That is why China has not officially endorsed Putin's narrative; the collateral risks to the Chinese trade of being associated with a tyrant is too great. Putin might have put China in an embarrassing position, bringing back to the fore China's own recent history of oppression and anti-western sentiments, which could no longer be ignored even by its staunchest supporters.
Xi Jinping's "no limit friendship" with Putin seems to actually have hit a limit quite quickly. While the CCP has no qualm committing a genocide in Xinjiang, officially endorsing one in another country is another matter altogether and would shatter China's doctored image as a peacemaker. Also, as its economy is still being battered by ill-conceived Covid measures, China is no going to force itself in a position that would alienate its principal trade partners, which Russia is not even close to being one of (and here). Dictators have no friends, they have business associates: when the going gets tough, these "associates" are nowhere to be found and will turn on the bully when he no longer is in a position of power.
Xi will also take note that the free world unanimously rallied behind Ukraine and against Putin. Billions have poured into Ukraine from the West. If Xi was not sure of the West's resolve, that should set him straight. That should make him pause and reconsider any invasion of Taiwan in that light.
The net result of Russia's collapse is that it will leave China isolated and therefore ideologically weaker. As Hitler's demise marked the end of the rise of fascism in Europe, Putin's could be rekindling the progressive democratic ideals, based on cooperation, still with one hegemon in the West but a multitude of nimble mid-size democratic powers trading in a more symbiotic fashion.
I believe that there will be areas of economic activity that will be less globalized than before; the realization that non-renewable energy are mostly in the hands of questionable and unpredictable regimes will be a strong drive for countries to achieve energy independence.
Advanced tech will be re-on-shored but everything that cannot be easily automated but is highly commoditized will remain offshore but will move to smaller (population-wise), friendlier nations.
I hope that this terrible event would also be the opportunity for the West to look at Africa differently. That its development, lead by Africans, could be the driver ensuring peace and wealth for the world over the next 200 years.
