As 2022 is coming to a close (it flew by so quickly!), let's look back at my predictions for the year, and I will give you my opinion on what I think 2023 and beyond have in store for us.
Jan 2022 entry: https://would-that-be-interesting-to-you.blogspot.com/2022/01/what-to-expect-of-2022.html
Mid-year update: https://would-that-be-interesting-to-you.blogspot.com/2022/06/mid-2022-update.html
Covid-19
Despite the recently announced variants which have fueled a new wave of cases in Singapore, the world has moved past Covid and the stats are encouraging.
Hong Kong
Not much to say. Hong Kong is dead. Carrie Lam and the CCP killed it. It is not going to get better because the fundamentals are not changing: a dictatorship cannot survive in the long run and it will revert Hong Kong's amazing economic and societal progresses of the past 70 years.
HSI: If you had invested any money on July 1st, 1997 (retrocession) and held it to now, it would have not appreciated at all... That is, 0% ROI |
Expect more institutional rot, increasing corruption, stagnating GDP, further brain drains, and general exodus. On the bright side? Property will be a lot more affordable in 5 years!
China:
Housing, where most of Chinese's population's equity is stored, keeps going down. This is going to erode support even for the most nationalistic Chinese person.
- China's population is aging and sending youth, China's future, to a rhetorical war, would be the end of Xi
- Even the most optimistic scenario would see hundreds of thousands of China's precious boys die during the invasion
- Taiwan is an island. No invasion attempt can be made unannounced; a blitzkrieg is therefore impossible. Xi would not be deluded in thinking this would be anything but a protracted war
- A successful invasion would then require a multi-year occupation and reform. Millions of soldiers would be required
- There are no signs of military buildup in the short run.
- Xi is keenly aware that if what was supposed to be the second most powerful army in the world (Russia) got absolutely humiliated in Ukraine, the risk of humiliation over a Taiwan invasion would be even greater. Xi would never put himself in a situation where his legacy would be one of another 100 years of humiliation.
- Back in August, when U.S house speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, Beijing scheduled unprecedented military exercises around the state island. However, it was revealed that, contrary to initial plans, "Chinese warships stayed at least 24 nautical miles away from Taiwan’s coast during recent military drills despite warnings from Beijing that they could come well within the island’s territorial waters,according to senior government officials in Taipei.". This was a definite tell that the whole exercise was meant to save face and appease Chinese nationalist and not a show of force that would risk starting WW3. Clearly, at the very least the Chinese military knew they needed to show restraint.
- With the past 2 years impacts of U.S sanctions on China in the tech sector, Xi was reminded that China is not able to live yet in isolationism from global-trade with the free-world. It might never be. And an invasion of Taiwan would certainly bring in drastic sanctions against China which its currently feeble economy could not withstand.
- It would take a few years for China to prepare for an invasion and the signs would be obvious. At this point, despite the rhetoric, none have materialized...
I think the scarecrow of a deep recession in 2023 is fomented by investment banks trying to prevent the feds from raising rates some more, as cheap money fuels investments, which has been lining their pockets for the past 15 years. They are reactive rather than looking at the fundamentals which is that inflation is there because of excess demand in an extraordinarily strong economy, limited by short-term external factors (war in Ukraine, Covid pent-up demand). As such, these IBs have been providing mostly biased opinions, over analysis, here, here, here. Now, when faced with reality of stocks being resilient, they turn their views 180 (here, here, here)
Fed Funds Effective Rate |
https://www.redfin.com/us-housing-market |
Recession indicators:
Yield curve is deeply inverted. A strong leading indicator of recession. |
The following indicators are not as reliable as the yield-curve inversion as indicators but when the signals they send align with the YC's, it strengthens the case for predicting a recession.
Global Purchasing Managers Index is trending down. The trend is an early indicator of recession. |
The Consumer Confidence Index is trending down. It is an early to concurrent indicator. |
U.S unemployment is a late indicator. As such, it is not a predictor of recession but rather, would confirm one has occurred. |
- Crypto currencies are deflating, and that bubble is isolated from the real economy.
- Housing prices are easing slowly; no mortgage-backed derivatives to create a sudden break.
- Techs are deflating but this already has been discounted for and has had minimal impact on unemployment, no serious impact on the economy
- U.S personal saving rate is low and trending down, so it could not fuel consumption during an impending recession, but with the overnight rate at 5% once stabilized, the Fed will have ample room to cut rates to revive the economy should it need to.
- The Fed balance sheet unwinding could be headwind, but it started in June to little effect on the economy, and the Fed is in in full control of when it stopped, and it can easily be reversed.
- Voter's turnout was low, but mostly unchanged, from 66.45% in 2018, to 66.15% on Oct 3rd, 2022. Note that this is about the same turnout as the historically high 2020 U.S presidential elections (66.8%) and the 2019 Canada General Elections (67%). It is also much higher than the 2022 Ontario provincial elections (43.53%)
- CAQ saw an increase in voters' support (+9.5%), from 37.42% of eligible voters in 2018, to 40.98% in 2022. That translated into 21.6% more seats for the CAQ.
- PLQ got a beating, with support going from 24.82% in 2018, to 14.37% in 2022 (-42%). That translated into 32% fewer seats for the PLQ.
- QS' support stayed relatively stable (4% decrease), going from 16.1% in 2018, to 15.43% in 2022
- While PQ's support decreased by 14%, from 17.06% of eligible voters in 2018, to 14.61% in 2022, its representation got hammered, going from 10 to 3 seats (-70%) in parliament.
- PCQ went from 1.46% of the popular vote in 2018, to 12.91% in 2022 (+784%). Yet, this did not translate into any seats for the Parti Conservateur du Québec.
- Whoever was following survey aggregators sites like QC125.com, would have had no surprise as to who would win, be the official opposition party, and which party leader would be elected and which would not (see below charts). Survey results were all within a 10% margin of errors, and QC125.com accurately predicted the outcome of the 2022 elections. As such, back 6 months ago, my own predictions which were based on data from QC125 , were also quite accurate (more on this later).
Official results from Elections Quebec |